MAHAN'S BLINDNESS AND BRILLIANCE

A Review Essay by

BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered
by Jon Tetsor Sumida
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.
137 pp. $24.95
[ISBN 0–8018–5800–3]

Ironclads at War: The Origin and Development of the Armored Warship, 1854–1891
by Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani
Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Publishing, 1998.
423 pp. $34.95
[ISBN 0–938289–58–6]

The reputation of Alfred Thayer Mahan as a brilliant and influential naval theorist is not in doubt. Nor is that of his near-contemporary, Karl Marx, as an economic and political thinker. For historians, Mahan and Marx will always be significant for ideas that had an impact on their own times and on several following generations. But a consideration today is the truth and relevance of their ideas for war and politics on the eve of a new century.

During the Cold War, an understanding of Marx was regarded as fundamental to knowing your enemy. Now Marx is rarely discussed in our war colleges. His ideas have been relegated to the dustbin of history. At a time when the United States faces no naval peer and is unlikely to for the foreseeable future, similar issues should be raised about Mahan's ideas on seapower. Should they guide naval policy into the first half of the 21st century? Are they likely to influence a state seeking to challenge American naval power?

Two recent books offer helpful perspectives on such questions. Jon Sumida in *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command* explicates Mahan using superb analysis, clear and elegant prose, and a masterly synthesis of the body of the admiral's work. Moreover, he achieves this feat in 117 pages. If that were not enough, a bibliography of the literature by or about Mahan, as well as an analytical index, add value to the book. In the future no one seriously interested in American naval history, Mahan's ideas, or the strategic role of seapower will be able to ignore Sumida's slim volume. In short, it is a masterpiece.

By contrast, the authors of *Ironclads at War* render a much more conventional narrative on the evolution of armored warships and their operations during the second half of the 19th century. Nonetheless, Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani have produced a rewarding book. Not only do they offer a fascinating understanding of naval technology during the transition from the age of sail to the age of steam; they recount little-known naval battles from various conflicts. In addition, by placing naval aspects of the Crimean War, American Civil War, Prussian-Austrian-Danish War (1864), War of the American Union (Spain versus Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Bolivia, 1864–67), War of the Triple Alliance (Paraguay versus Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, 1865–70), Italian-Austrian War (1866), Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), Russo-Turkish War (1877–78), South American War of the Pacific (1879–83), and Franco-Chinese War (1884–85) in context, the authors grant unusual insights into the influence of these wars on the ongoing development of armored and steam-driven naval technology, tactics, operations, and strategy.

Greene and Massignani have built a heretofore absent bridge of understanding for students of naval history, a historical connection between the naval aspects of the far more familiar wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon and those of the Spanish-American, Russo-Japanese, and First World Wars. Among other benefits, this span between two eras gives additional appreciation of Mahan's thinking. The authors enable readers to look back from the international naval events of 1854–85 to the age of Nelson, just as Mahan did. And those with even a superficial knowledge of the naval history of 1898–1918 can connect what this book relates to events of the coming age of the pre-dreadnought and dreadnought. While facilitating this useful glance backward and forward, however, Greene and Massignani raise disturbing questions about the validity of Mahan's theories. This does not seem to have been their intention—Mahan is mentioned only briefly and uncritically toward the end—yet it may provide the greatest worth of their unique book.

Although this reviewer has taught at Newport and reread *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783* for the second, third, and even fourth time to discuss it with eleven seminar groups, he gained fresh appreciation of Mahan's thinking from *Inventing Grand Strategy*. Sumida argues convincingly that Mahan was far more flexible about applying the tenets of naval warfare and much less rigid in his insistence on the necessity for a decisive engagement with an enemy fleet than commonly supposed. Because Mahan's father, Dennis Hart Mahan, taught at West Point for nearly fifty years and was influenced by Jomini, many scholars have emphasized the Napoleonic influence on the younger Mahan. Some have gone so far as to label A.T. Mahan "the Jomini of the sea," maintaining that both men stressed operations over strategy, insisted on a deterministic set of rules for conducting war, and argued that success in war basically amounted to seizing a superior position, then smashing one's enemy in an all-or-nothing battle. Sumida agrees that there is some validity in this portrayal of Mahan's early ideas. But he emphasizes that the admiral developed far more sophisticated thinking as his grasp of war deepened. Even D.H. Mahan came to reject the idea of an all-inclusive theory of warfare, eventually arguing that the practice of war was an art, not a science, and that the study of military history was more useful than knowledge of geometry for appreciating the nature of warfare.

Alfred Thayer Mahan reached similar conclusions; thus he based his study of seapower on history and eventually described Jomini as too absolute and pedantic for his insistence on a precise formulation of the principles of war. Instead, the admiral came to believe that seapower should be used primarily to achieve strategic goals established by a navy's government. There was no sense in winning battles for their own sake. Indeed, while stressing Nelsonian aggressiveness as the key element in naval victory, Mahan still observed that a defeat that led to a favorable strategic outcome was infinitely preferable to a victory that gained nothing but "sterile glory."

Serving in an age of enormous technological transition, Mahan worried that scientific and material factors were increasingly overshadowing the human

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element in naval warfare. He pointed out that good sailors could win with inferior equipment while the finest technology was of little use to badly led and badly trained men. He insisted that training and education—especially if based on naval and wider aspects of history—were more critical in preparing for war than the latest forms of weapons, propulsion, and armor. What ultimately led to victory was educated intuition based on experience, study of history, superior leadership qualities, and the ability to operate despite one's fear, anxiety, uncertainty, and confusion of battle. In other words, Mahan's mature ideas are an excellent antidote for the current belief that technology can virtually eliminate the fog of war and the friction inherent in warfare. Mahan, Sumida contends, was more a Clausewitzian than a Jominian.

So what seeds of doubt do Greene and Massignani cast in *Ironclads at War* about the verity of Mahan's concepts? Ironically, their narrative strongly suggests that despite his great stress on the usefulness of history for understanding war, Mahan ignored the highly relevant naval events of his own lifetime as he theorized.

To this reviewer, previously ignorant of many naval conflicts which these authors analyze, it had appeared that Mahan had no choice but to use examples from the age of sail to formulate concepts for seapower in the age of steam. There seemed little armored steam-driven warship experience from which he could draw. However, *Ironclads at War* makes clear that the opposite was true. There had been ten significant naval wars involving modern warships between Mahan's adolescence and mid-1886 when he began *The Influence of Sea Power*. More important, these ten conflicts—which are surely enough to guide students of naval history—offered example after example to undermine many of Mahan's concepts of naval strategy and operations. He may have been more flexible than previously acknowledged about putting principles into action. But no idea, however adaptable, can be stretched too far without breaking. It seems that a number of Mahan's theories founder when they run into the wars of 1854–85.

There is no point in gloating over Mahan's missteps. The mark of great thinkers is not the absence of error in their concepts but the creation of ideas that prove of lasting value. However, if theoreticians are shown to be wrong even in the light of their own times, or if they misunderstand contemporary facts that undermine their interpretation of reality, then their influence is diminished. Such thinkers may still be influential but that is quite different from discovering new depths of truth. In this regard, Mahan seems to fail part of the test of greatness. He ignored or misunderstood too much of what was taking place in naval affairs between 1856 when he entered Annapolis and 1890 when his first major work on seapower appeared.

To begin with, control of the seas during the actual conflicts of that period did not bring the benefits that Mahan insisted it would. Consider the naval advantages of Britain and France in the Crimea, the Union in the Civil War, Austria and Prussia in 1864, Paraguay's enemies in 1865–70, Russia in 1877–78, and France over China in 1884–85. It would be foolish to dismiss superiority as insignificant. After all, Britain and France could not have even reached the Crimea without their dominion of the sea, and one can hardly regard the North's naval superiority over the Confederacy as unimportant. But neither did such capabilities bring the stronger naval powers victory. Why? Because by the middle of the last century technology was reducing the previously powerful and largely independent role of sea transport and naval interdiction in economics and in war.

Courtesy of Special Collections, NDU Library

Admiral Alfred T. Mahan.

Nelson had opined, "A ship's a fool to fight a fort." That had been true when such a duel pitted wooden hulls against stone bastions bristling with guns far heavier than any ship of the line carried. In the half century between Trafalgar and the allied bombardment of Fort Kinburn and Sveaborg, however, naval technology had advanced a good deal. The Crimean War bore witness to steam-powered, armored shell-firing vessels that blasted apart Russian fortifications in the Baltic and Black Seas with impunity. Greene and Massignani point out that the threat this capability posed by the defense of St. Petersburg—Sweden was close to entering the war, which would have offered the allies naval support bases close to the Russian capital—persuaded Alexander II to send his ministers to the peace table, not the destruction of his Black Sea fleet, the disruption of Russia's negligible maritime commerce, nor the fall of Sebastopol. However, the use of navies to attack land targets, cover amphibious landings, and carry out other joint operations hardly represented what Mahan would describe some thirty years later as the ideal use of naval power. Nonetheless, the course of European and American industrialization made advanced nations far less dependent on maritime commerce to sustain a war economy, while railways allowed land transport to compete for the first time with water transportation in terms of cost, efficiency, and load bearing.

By the early 20th century the change in the balance of sea and landpower would become even more pronounced. One set of statistics illustrates this point. In 1870 the combined merchant fleets of the six greatest European powers had displaced 9.3 million tons; by 1910 they had nearly doubled to 18.3 million tons, along with their cargo-carrying capacity. But during the same forty years, the railroad networks of these countries more than tripled from 47,000 to 145,000 miles and the freight they carried rose from 290 millions tons to 1.683 billion tons, nearly a sixfold increase. Moreover, these figures do not include the growing length of rail lines nor the weight of rail traffic in European colonies. Despite rising efficiencies of steam over sail, the huge savings in the cost of shipping derived from the Suez Canal, and the burgeoning economic role of overseas possessions for Europe, investment in railways was proving even more valuable in every respect. The Panama and Suez Canals were less significant to the growth and security of the United States, Russia, and India than the Transcontinental, Siberian, and Great Indian Peninsula Railroads.



USS Maine in Havana Harbor, 1898.

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During the same period seapower lost its transoceanic monopoly over the communication of information. The Atlantic cable was completed in 1865. More significantly, wireless telegraph and radio transmissions were perfected in the decade after 1891, culminating in the first transmission by Marconi from England to Newfoundland in 1901. Zeppelin's airship made its first successful flight in 1900. Three years later, the Wright brothers took to the air over Kitty Hawk while Blériot and Farman made their historic flights in 1909. Seapower could no longer block nor give access to the flow of intelligence as it had in the days of Hawke, Rodney, and Nelson.

By 1890 technology had long since altered warfare in ways antithetical to Mahan and his ideas on the preferable employment of battle fleets. One did not have to wait until the German use of the submarine during World War I for evidence that Mahan was completely wrong to insist that "It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it. . . . This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies."

Yet as recent work by Chester Hearn and Raimondo Luraghi has convincingly asserted, steam power enabled eight Confederate cruisers to wreak utter havoc on the entire Union merchant fleet, a blow from which American shipping took decades to recover. Simultaneously, despite the Northern naval blockade, Southern industrialization made the Confederacy self-sufficient in armaments only three years after secession. Meanwhile, defensive naval technology—the torpedoes (primitive sea mines) which Admiral Farragut damned at Mobile Bay, for example—was preventing the U.S. Navy from enforcing a close blockade of the Gulf and Atlantic coasts.

Technology in the latter half of the 19th century rendered other aspects of Mahan's thinking obsolete. The first torpedo in the current sense of the term was invented by Robert Whitehead in 1866, with ominous consequences for Mahan's theories more than twenty years before he devised them. Whether merchant or naval, 17th and 18th century sailing ships had been close to identical in speed and protection. But the advantages enjoyed by an armored, high-speed, shell-firing cruiser over a steamer of the same era, post-1860, gave it enormous superiority as a commerce raider in comparison to its frigate predecessors.

Nonetheless, the influence of technology was reducing the relative position of seapower. The destruction of railways, not naval blockade, doomed the Confederacy in 1863–65. Particularly telling is the fact that the Civil War was the only conflict in which Mahan served. He performed blockade duty, the focus of his first book, *The Gulf and Inland Waters*.

That railways transformed war was demonstrated by Helmuth von Moltke, who used them in the wars of 1866 and 1870–71. In the latter conflict between France and the German states, the French under Admirals Louis-Henri de Gueydon and Louis-Édoard Bouët-Willaumez deployed to the North Sea and Baltic. But despite overwhelming naval superiority, Greene and Massignani demonstrate that the French fleets accomplished virtually nothing. Prussia neither had possessions overseas nor depended on maritime commerce. Its railroads supplied all the needs for war against France, which sought a decisive sea battle while the Prussian navy refused to leave port. Lacking both ships capable of inshore operations and forces for amphibious landings—which Mahan found unwise distractions from concentrations of a battle fleet—French admirals steamed back and forth uselessly for several months, then sailed home. No wonder the French developed the *Jeune École* concept of naval warfare that stressed commerce-raiding cruisers and David-like torpedo boats over giant battleships.

The above points hardly present new arguments against Mahan. Some were raised in the mid-1890s. Still *Ironclads at War* suggests questions about his selection of the history on which to base seapower concepts. Had there been no major naval warfare from the downfall of Napoleon to the time when Mahan began to write *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, his choice of the period 1660–1783 (and later 1792–1815) to illustrate his ideas would be unremarkable. But Greene and Massignani demonstrate just how much recent naval experience and mid- to late-19th century technological development he dismissed. After reading *Ironclads at War*, one wonders whether Mahan was an objective analyst or a polemicist arguing for construction of a modern U.S. Navy.

As a result, it seems highly unlikely that a future naval opponent would base its operations and strategy on Mahanian principles. In fact, history has already shown that this would be folly. An old gibe retailed at the Naval War College suggests that the United States owes a great debt to Mahan. The adoption of his ideas by Germany, Italy, and Japan doomed their surface fleets to defeat in the two world wars. Mahan was a primary influence on the decision to construct the modern U.S. Navy. But as George Baer and other historians have pointed out, the admiral's ideas did not guide American naval strategy in World Wars I and II nor the Cold War. In the

Atlantic-Mediterranean theater, including the post-1945 era, the Navy concentrated on convoy protection and amphibious operations. In the Pacific, it focused on amphibious warfare as well as commerce destruction. It fought enemy battle fleets only when they sought out our forces or as an adjunct to landings by the Army or Marines.

Does Mahan have value for the 21st century? Sumida supplies a convincing answer in the last chapter of *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command*. The enduring value of Mahan is not to be found in dated notions of naval power and strategy. Instead it is his approach to thinking about threats and the use of force, methods to inculcate strategic thinking, concepts of leadership and command, and ideas on the very nature of warfare that provide the classic worth of his works. The admiral invented modern security studies through the use of historical cases to analyze strategy and operations. He also established a way to relate the principles of war, developed to understand land warfare, to conflict at sea.

Mahan displayed the courage and common sense to admit mistakes and change his mind. Over the final two decades of his life, he concluded that ideas that had made him famous and respected in the 1890s were erroneous. On reflection he would admit that as technology altered patterns of commerce and transport it transformed the purpose of navies and thus the proper makeup of fleets. Having earlier argued that seapower had made England the most powerful state in the world, he recognized that the British Empire was declining and argued for what later would become known as the special relationship to maintain North Atlantic and global security. Most importantly, Mahan foresaw how the United States should function as a great international power. More than anyone else before or since, he educated both the Navy and the American people on the use of diplomacy, military force, and warfare on a global scale when isolationism still ruled the foreign policy formulated along the Potomac. For these reasons, despite his faults as a historian and a prophet, Alfred Thayer Mahan deserves the gratitude and respect of his countrymen and free people everywhere—a claim that can hardly be made for Karl Marx. JFQ

REASSESSING THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM, AGAIN

A Book Review by
F.G. HOFFMAN

The Wrong War:
Why We Lost in Vietnam
by Jeffrey Record
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998.
256 pp. $27.95
[ISBN 1–55750–699–X]

Ever since the last helicopter lifted off the roof of the American embassy in Saigon in 1975, professional soldiers, defense analysts, military historians, and pundits of all stripes have debated the reasons for America's failure in South Vietnam. Assessments range from flaws in national security decisionmaking to vehement assaults on micromanaging civilians who imposed constraints on the military. Some indict liberal journalists and Jane Fonda for losing the conflict. The result is a perpetuation of Vietnam myths that still influence attitudes toward the Armed Forces.

"Americans have yet to come to terms with the war," Jeffrey Record states in a recent book, *The Wrong War*, "precisely because they cannot agree on what happened to the United States in Vietnam and why." Was it a winnable noble cause or a colossal strategic blunder? Did the military fight with one hand tied behind their backs? Did Americans die in vain? What were the causes and nature of the conflict? Were they accurately assessed? Was there consistency in U.S. political and military strategies? If we were strategically defeated, what led to it and who is to blame?

A former legislative assistant to Senators Sam Nunn and Lloyd Bentsen, Record served as an adviser in Vietnam with the Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support program. His last book, *Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War*, advanced his standing in the eyes of many readers as an objective analyst and brutally candid observer of American military affairs.

Record seeks to answer some basic questions on the Vietnam conflict in *The Wrong War*. Why did a great power lose a protracted war against a "damn little piss ant country?" How should responsibility for America's defeat be allocated? What roles did civilian and military leaders play in making strategy? Was the war winnable? Would defeat have been avoidable if another strategy had been pursued? The author rejects determinism and reminds us that violence between states leads to complex dilemmas which are difficult to dissect or analyze. But he accepts that the war was within our capacity to win militarily because North Vietnam could have been crushed by American might. The issue is whether the United States could have won with the political and military limits it placed on itself. The author identifies four causes for defeat:

- misinterpretation or overestimation of the significance and nature of the conflict
- woeful underestimation of the opponent's tenacity and combat power
- overestimation of U.S. political stamina and military effectiveness in the theater
- absence of a politically competitive partner in South Vietnam.

The arrogance of the U.S. government during the early stages of the conflict has been the subject of many books. Ignorant of Vietnamese history, geography, and culture, Americans failed to grasp the nature of the war. Estimates of the resolve, tenacity, and commitments by participants were poorly constructed and, in retrospect, utterly baseless.

The asymmetries of commitment between combatants proves decisive in *The Wrong War*. What Record calls a "culturally rooted disposition" to focus on tangible indices of national power and quantifiable measures of effectiveness enabled the United States to ignore imponderables and intangibles—factors which Clausewitz warned were decisive. He singles out Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for "know it all assertiveness with a capacity for monumental misjudgment and a dearth of moral courage worthy of Albert Spear" and blamed him for transforming his office into a "temple of quantitative analysis" that worshiped empirical but irrelevant facts.

Such criticism is well founded but certainly not unique. The central issues the author raises concern assigning blame to civilian and military decisionmakers. Here he offers his strongest and most valuable conclusions. He notes that

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while civilians were ultimately in charge, "the military's accountability was significant and cannot and should not be overlooked." He adds that history is not well served by the false "portrayal of the military as innocent and hapless victims of civilian perfidy." The Joint Chiefs agreed, without protest, to restrictions on military operations that were improper infringements on their prerogatives and inconsistent with the principles of war.

In the final analysis, Record's opinion of American military leadership differs from that of H.R. McMaster in *Dereliction of Duty,* which severely chides the Joint Chiefs for remaining silent and not aggressively offering their advice on the conduct of the war. The ground war was fought largely as Westmoreland desired, with little interference from Washington.

Trashing the members of the "we had to fight with one hand tied behind our backs" school, Record affirms that the Armed Forces shot themselves in the foot with an ill-conceived strategy of attrition, an excessive use of firepower (including massive bombing against a Third World nation), a fractured command authority, and personnel policies that contributed to high levels of careerism, poor morale, reduced cohesion, and combat ineffectiveness.

Building on themes developed by Andrew Krepinevich in *The Army in Vietnam* and Ron Specter in *After Tet*, the author criticizes the military for fighting the war they wanted rather than the one at hand. He points out that Westmoreland and the Defense Establishment had considerable control over the war in South Vietnam, though air operations over the North were restricted by policymakers in Washington because of their fear of escalation. Thus he observes:

It was—and remains—disingenuous of the military and their political supporters to whine about civilian intrusion upon potential U.S. military effectiveness in Vietnam when the U.S. military itself was hobbling that effectiveness through disunity of command, a faulty attrition strategy, rear area bloat, and idiotic personnel rotation policies.

Surprisingly, he rejects the arguments advanced by Krepinevich and Specter and concludes that there is "no compelling evidence that an earlier and less restrained American use of force in Indochina, absent the subsequent emergence of a politically and militarily viable South Vietnam," would have dissuaded Hanoi from continuing its revolutionary war.

While critical of military aspects of the war Record is also disturbed by the underfunding of efforts to bolster Saigon's political infrastructure and by belated attempts at pacification. He is not convinced that America was capable of pacifying South Vietnam. But he is mistaken in assuming that the U.S. military was accountable for designing and undertaking nation-building. Nowhere are alternatives discussed or assessed. It is taken for granted that saving political and economic infrastructure was a legitimate task for the American military to lead.

The author expresses pessimism about South Vietnam as a partner. America "could not have picked a more intractable enemy and a feebler ally." The South did not accept the Americanization of the war nor was it able to build a nation which could survive without massive U.S. intervention which, by itself, was destructive to Saigon's political, economic, and social structures. In the end, the leadership of the South was "fatally out of touch with its own people" and unable to establish and maintain the credibility and support to thwart the North's incessant drive to unify the country.

Record's conclusions are ambiguous. He finds it difficult to avoid determining that the United States lacked any strategically decisive and morally acceptable military options in Vietnam. He prefers to echo the famous lament uttered by Omar Bradley that Korea was "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

This is an equivocal and unsatisfying conclusion. It does not evaluate political and military options that might have persuaded China and Russia to refrain from supplying North Vietnam or that could have at least minimized access to its port and other facilities. Major intervention in 1965, to include strategic bombing, naval blockade, and a substantive investment in political and military capital, may have convinced the North and their supporters that America was serious. Incremental investments gave the impression that the United States was not committed and ceded escalation to its adversaries. Gradualism as a strategy was clearly disproven in Vietnam, but it is a long stretch to conclude that the war was unwinnable under any circumstances or strategy.

Nor does Record admit the potential of pacification programs. The United States devoted 95 percent of its resources to search and destroy operations in rural areas of Vietnam, employing overwhelming firepower against targets that did not warrant the expenditure. It seems in retrospect that an effective pacification campaign, in addition to vigorous training of the Vietnamese military between 1961 and 1965, might have had some chance of success.

Numerous books have touted efforts such as the Combined Action Platoon, which was originated by the Marine Corps, based on its exclusive experience in fighting small wars. Record acknowledges that the Marines had an affinity for irregular warfare but did not address how similar programs could be implemented or expanded. He is correct in stating that there is compelling evidence that the way the war was conducted—using firepower-oriented, attrition-based search and destroy operations—was inappropriate. Although it is true that the U.S. military as a whole was culturally disposed to its uniquely American technocentric approach to warfare, it does not necessarily hold that a multifaceted civil-miliary approach could not have been designed or effectively implemented earlier. More than mere assertion is needed to conclude otherwise.

Overall this book can be recommended not because it offers a complete or original analysis of the Vietnam War but because it synthesizes many of the contending perspectives generated over the last two decades. For far too long Vietnam has been regarded as an anomaly that resulted from the incompetence of arrogant civilian leaders. As *The Wrong War* reveals, the situation was much more complex, and the military must assume some of the blame. The conflict was multifaceted, and assigning culpability for misjudgments requires a comprehensive examination. Although Record elucidates some of the questions needed to formulate such a framework, he does substantiate many of his conclusions.

Record dispels a number of prevailing myths about Vietnam. A generation of has grown up on the lessons of this conflict, and many institutions were reshaped so that there would be "no more Vietnams." The price of learning those lessons was high. Thus it is incumbent on political officials and professional soldiers to validate them unemotionally and objectively. This book is a step towards that goal. **JFQ**